SOCRATES ON JUSTICE AND
LEGAL OBLIGATION
Donald H. J. Hermann*
Socrates lives in history partly because he gave his life for the
conviction that duty of obedience to secular law does not presuppose consent to its enactment or belief in its virtue.

-Justice Frankfurter'
The lesson of Socrates is perplexing, as his actions are exemplary
both of archetypal civil disobedience and consummate civil obedience. The incident is well-known and simple. Socrates, a teacher, was
charged with crimes against the city. 2 At trial, he admitted the facts
of the allegation, yet denied the criminality of his conduct. 3 He was
motivated in his actions by justice. 4 He was found guilty and sentenced to death., While in prison, a friend tried to persuade him to
escape and thereby avoid punishment. Socrates refused and submitted
to the city's sanction. 6
The Apology is Socrates' defense before the Athenian court; the
Crito contains the discussion of his rejection of escape. It has been
argued that the character of the individual's obligation to the law
differs between the dialogs and is in fact inconsistent. 7 It has been
* A.B., Stanford University, 1965; J.D., Columbia University, 1968; L.I.M., Harvard
University, 1974; M.A., Northwestern University, 1979; Ph.D., Northwestern 1981 (anticipated); Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
I West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Barnette was a first amendment challenge to a school's flag salute requirement; the
liberty to abstain from such a ritual was upheld, not on the basis of freedom of religion, but
rather on grounds of freedom of expression. Id. at 624 (Jackson, J.).
' See Apology, 24 b-c, 26 b. Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and teaching false
gods. Id. In the course of his defense, he debunked these charges as both fraudulent and
inconsistent. See id. at 24 d - 27 d.
In this paper, citation to the Platonic dialogs is in standard form, that is, according to the
pagination of the 1578 Stephanus edition. Quotations are taken from E. HAMILTON & H.
CAIRNS, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (1961), which includes both the Apology and
Crito, translated by Hugh Tredennick. For a discussion of the Socratic source problem, see note
9 infra.
3 Apology, 26 a.
4 See notes 41 & 46 infra and accompanying text.
Apology, 36 a & 38 c-d.
6 Crito, passim. Execution was via forced suicide, by drinking hemlock. See Phaedo, 117 e 118 a.
I See, e.g., 1 G. GROTE, PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES 428-29 (1888).
Grote's position is that Plato wrote the Apology as a true apologetic, merely to defend Socrates
against the charges of having been arrogant and having placed himself beyond the law. Id. The
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further argued that, to the extent that Socrates accepted the sentence
in his trial and refused to escape, he took a position that the duty to
obey law is absolute, and that it mattered not whether the particular
law be just or unjust. 8 The overall coherence of the Socratic theory 9
of the nature of legal obligation has consequently been doubted.1 0
This article, in providing an account of Socrates' treatment of the
matter of legal obligation, will show the misunderstanding of these
interpretations. An effort will be made to reconcile the accounts given
in the Apology and Crito, first by distinguishing the contexts in which
the issue is raised in the two dialogs, and then by providing an account
of a unifying principle underlying the different results in the two
instances."
An examination of Socrates' notion of legal obligation

result in the Apology is compared with an interpretation of the Crito, that the obligation to obey
the law is qualified only by the vocation to philosphy. See Young, Socrates and Obedience, 19
PHRONESIS 1, 29 (1974).
1 E.g., Martin, Socrates on Disobedience to Law, 24 REv. Metaphysics 21 (1970). Martin
concludes that Socrates
argued that all laws should be obeyed (not, of course, obeyed when they are unjust
because they are unjust, but in spite of their being unjust). They are to be obeyed
simply because they are duly enacted laws. So it would appear that the question
whether a law should be obeyed is not to be answered with regard to whether it is
just or unjust. That consideration is ultimately irrelevant.
Id. at 37-38. It will be argued in this article that this conclusion is based on a fundamental
misreading of the Apology and the Crito.
9 In this paper it is assumed that the Apology and Crito are approximate statements of
Socrates' actual position; thus are ignored considerations of the biographic accuracy of the
historic Socrates and the relationship of the Apology and Crito to the remainder of the Platonic
corpus. See generally, e.g., Chroust, Socrates-A Source Problem, 19 NEw SCHOLASTcisM 48
(1945). This is a traditional and accepted reading. The early dialogs-which include the Crito
and Apology-are thought to be transcriptions of incidents in Socrates' life by his student, Plato.
Later dialogs such as the Republic or Symposium-which also feature Socrates as a characterare thought to represent the mature thought of Plato himself, with little basis in historical fact.
"0 This is, for example, Martin's conclusion. Martin, supra note 8, at 38. Accord, D'Amato,
Obligation To Obey The Law: A Study 0f The Death Of Socrates, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1079
(1976).
11 One effort at such a reconciliation is to draw a distinction between a law in general and
the law as applied. The argument is made that the only issue is whether the law in general is just;
if so, it must be obeyed. While the particular application may be unjust because of the failings of
the humans in whose hands the law is placed for administration, such failings are to be expected,
and any concomitant injustice in administration will not serve as a basis for disobedience. See
Hall, Plato's Legal Philosophy, 31 IND. L.J. 171 (1956). Hall notes that
[t]he gist of Socrates' position comes to this: Athenian law is right law.
But the specific application of such law to human affairs, the administration of law,
the decisions and sentences are sometimes erroneous and, therefore, unjust. But since
laws are applied only in particular decisions, those judgments must be obeyed even if
they are unjust. Any other view leads to anarchy.
Id. at 173.
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will reveal further that he did not require one to act on an unjust
law. 2 Rather, a complete and coherent paradigm of the relation
between the individual and the law can be delineated.13
In the Apology, Socrates admitted to three instances when he
would not or did not obey a law or follow a command. Firstly, he
indicated that he would not stop teaching philosophy even if ordered
to do so as a condition for his release.14 Secondly, he acknowledged
that he had refused to agree to a mass trial for ten commanders who
had failed to rescue their men lost in a naval engagement, even
though the leaders in Athens were ready to denounce and arrest him
for his opposition. '5 Thirdly, he refused to follow the instruction of
the Thirty Commissioners who ordered him to bring Leon of Salamis
from his home for execution.' 6 In the Crito, however, Socrates was
adamant in his refusal to breach what he viewed as his legal obligation to accept the judicially imposed sentence of death by escaping
from prison, even though he had been unjustly convicted.' 7 While
Socrates seems to have taken a position of subjectively selective obligation to the law without any principle of choice, an examination of
each instance wherein the issue was raised will reveal not only a
factual ground for reconciling any apparent inconsistency but will

This effort at reconciliation must, however, be rejected on three grounds: it misconstrues
the nature of law and the function of law in Athenian courts, it fails to account for the specific
instances raised in the dialogs, and it fails to provide a coherent guide for human conduct
according to an ideal of justice requiring one to do no wrong.
12 See, e.g., Wade, In Defense Of Socrates, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 311 (1970). Father Wade's
article was in response to Martin, supra note 8.
13 It has been argued that Socrates' theory is coherent only within his own cultural
context,
and not generally applicable to society and more particularly, most emphatically inapplicable to
contemporary society. E.g., James, Socrates On Civil Disobedience, 11 S.J. PHILOSOPHY 119
(1973). James reasons that
[Socrates'] arguments are cogent only within his own cultural framework. Athens
was a small, close-knit society, not far removed from tribal origins, with citizenship
based on kinship, Socrates' attitudes toward the state, therefore, were quite different
from our own. It was natural for him to think of the state as prior to, and more
important than, the individual. We cannot think of the state in either of these ways.
Id. at 126.
The position taken in this paper is that Socrates' theory of legal obligation was not only
cogent but coherent; moreover, it is asserted here that the theory propounded by Socrates is not
limited to any particular cultural or political context.
1 Apology, 29 c-d, 30 c. See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
IS Apology, 32 b.
1I
17

Id. at 32 c.
E.g., Crito, 54 d. Socrates finally concluded discussion of the point by saying simply, "as

my opinion stands at present, it [is] useless to urge a different view." Id.
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also provide a basis for developing a general principle which underlies
Socrates' behavior.
Socrates described an incident which occurred during his term on
the Council of the City of Athens. A proposal had been made to try en
bloc ten military officers who had failed to rescue their men following
a naval action.18 Socrates admitted that he was the only member of
the executive group who had insisted that such a mass trial was
unconstitutional, and hence illegal, and so had voted against it. While
this action by Socrates generated some popular opposition and caused
the leaders of Athens to consider denouncing and arresting him, Socrates himself was not involved in any refusal to obey a law or
command of a ruler. Socrates argued that he was in fact standing firm
in his obligation to the law by maintaining that its procedures be
followed and its constitutional requirements met. He summed up his
position by observing, "it was my duty to face it on the side of the law
and justice rather than support you, through fear of prison or death,
in your wrong decision."'" Thus, Socrates argued that he had acted
not only on the basis of justice but also in obedience to law in opposing
the illegal action of a mass trial.
Whether Socrates continued to oppose the action of the Council
after it proceeded to conduct the mass trial is not known. If he did
continue such opposition the matter would be more complex. There
would then be questions of whether the Council's action was law
resulting from the mere fact that it took a particular action, or
whether procedures such as those proscribing mass trials had a legal
priority over the particular actions of the Council. If the latter alternative were to hold, then Socrates could continue to oppose the Council's action without violating any legal obligation and indeed would be
bound to oppose such a course on the basis of the proscription. If the
former were the case, then there would be an issue of whether
Socrates' continued opposition constituted a breach of a legal obligation and whether such breach was justified. While these issues cannot
be resolved within the terms of the dialog, a consideration of the
occasion of the order to arrest Leon of Salamis does provide an opportunity to consider Socrates' opinion on the question of obligation to
official action couched in mere commands.
The Thirty Commissioners had "summoned" Socrates along with
four other persons and "instructed" them to arrest Leon of Salamis at
his home to deliver him for execution. 20 The motive of the CommisIS Apology, 32 b.

"oId. at 32 C.
20 Id. at 32 e-d.
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sioners was suspect, as their effort was probably to implicate as many
citizens as possible in their tyranny. Socrates simply did not obey the
command and said, "I again made it clear not by my words but by my
actions that death did not matter to me."' 2' He made it clear that he
regarded the command as "wrong" and "wicked," but did not make it
clear whether he regarded the command as proper or as constituting
law in and of itself. Questions arise as to whether this command to
arrest Leon was made in conformity with necessary procedures. Even
if the command had been given in accordance with legal procedures,
a question remains whether Socrates as a citizen was legally obligated
to perform the arrest. If the command was not lawful or if Socrates
was under no duty to carry out the arrest, his action contrary to the
command would involve no breach of a legal obligation. But if the
instruction or command did constitute a legal order and if Socrates
were under a duty to carry out the order, one would need to face the
issue of whether such conduct involved a refusal to obey an unjust
law. The position taken in the Crito must then be considered; this will
be discussed below.
In the Apology, Socrates discussed whether he would stop practicing philosophy and stop teaching, if so directed by the jury.2 2 This
seems to be a bare refusal to conform to a lawful order, but a very
particular context surrounds this defiance. Socrates was actually discussing the issue of whether he would accept a discharge on condition
that he stop practicing philosphy, and it was a discharge on such a
condition that he refused. It was not an actual offer, but rather a
21 Id. at 32 d.
21 Id. at 29 c-d. This assertion suggests both the vocational aspect of philosophy as well as the
abstraction of the philosopher from the conventions of society.
Socrates' famous search for a person possessed of wisdom led ultimately to the oracle of
Delphi, who asserted that there was no-one wiser than Socrates. Id. at 20 e - 21 a. At first this
would seem to indicate that Socrates was the wisest man, id. at 21 b, but Socrates denied having
any true wisdom. E.g., id. at 23 b. Upon finding only arrogant, unrecognized ignorance in his
fellow citizens, Socrates concluded that his "wisdom" lay in not having any delusions. Id. at 22
d-e. His chore, pursuant to divine mandate, consisted of philosophizing, by which was meant the
debunking of false wisdom. Id. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615,
650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition
of how much one does not know").
This insight and duty serves to separate Socrates, the philospher, from the rest of the
citizens. As Socrates himself noted, "'[y~ou will not easily find another like me." Apology, 31 a.
The indictment was indeed brought against him in response to his philosophic activities. Id. at
23 c-e. Accord, id. at 30 c-e.
Socrates is consequently referenced as an example of the philsopher, simultaneously divorced from society and immersed therein. E.g., 1 H. ARENDT, THE LIF OF TIlE MIND 167-71
(1978). This tension between solitude and involvement has been suggested as the core of philosophy. Prufer, The PhilosophicAct, 2 INT'L PlLOSOPHY Q. 591 (1962).
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hypothetical one. 2 3 In response thereto, Socrates invoked his greater
obligation to God, which in turn had imposed on him the duty to
teach and philosophize. "Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and
devoted servant, but I owe a greater obedience to God than to you,
and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties I shall never stop
practicing philosophy and exhorting you and elucidating the truth to
everyone that I meet. 12 4 Socrates was, thus, not faced with a need to
consider the possibility of disobedience to a law, but rather merely
acceptance of a particular condition which might facilitate his release. The question is raised, however, whether Socrates would stop
teaching and philosophizing if he had been mandated to do so by a
law or direct legal order. Certainly the possibility that he would have
refused to obey such an order is suggested. 25 This possibility is germane to the view of the obligation of law as unconditional; this too
will be discussed below.
In the Crito, Socrates considers the obligation to law on the
occasion of his friends urging him to escape from prison to avoid the
death sentence which had been imposed on him. Socrates framed the
issue as "whether or not it is right for me to try to get away from here
without an official discharge. ' 26 Socrates was faced with a legal
verdict of guilty and a sentence of death imposed in conformity with
the legal procedures of Athens. 27 While there was a complaint about
the injustice of the jury's determination, there is no challenge either to
the procedural lawfulness of his trial, or the procedures under which
the sentence was imposed. 2 8 Nor were the laws which served as the
basis of the indictment criticized in terms of any internal injustice. 29
Socrates was squarely confronted with a choice of whether or not to
violate the laws of the city for his own benefit by saving his life. While
prudential considerations in favor of escape were mentioned and rejected, 30 the important issue is whether Socrates was committed to not

11Apology, 29 c. The verb therein, "suppose," would seem to indicate a subjunctive usage,
of a contrary-to-fact suggestion.
24 Id. at 29 d.
26

"

Id.

Crito, 48 b.
See id. at 50 c, 52 c. See generally Allen, The Trial of Socrates, in CouRTs AND TRIALS 1-21
(M. Friedland ed. 1977).
28 Allen observes that "[n]o irregularity in the proceedings was remarked either at the time or
afterward." Allen, supra note 27, at 5.
29 "At no point during the proceedings did Socrates deny that corrupting the young was a
criminal act punishable by death." D'Amato, supra note 10, at 1080. Likewise, Socrates did not
deny the propriety of punishing the irreligious.
;0 Crito, 44 b-c, 45 a - 46 a. Crito attempted to point out to Socrates the futility of his death,
the ease with which exile could be arranged, and Crito's own pain at the loss of a friend. Id.
27
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violating his legal obligation even if such violation would have redounded to his benefit. 3' The answer given is clearly in the negative.
Socrates assented to the proposition that, "[b]oth in war and in the
law courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and
your country command, or else persuade them in accordance with
universal justice. ' 32 The question arises whether this obligation is
unqualified, and in particular, what the terms of this obligation are.
It is further necessary to determine whether the obligation to law is
subject to an obligation of justice, and the relation of the duties of
justice and law. To answer these questions and to provide a reconciliation of apparently conflicting duties, it is necessary to consider Socrates' conceptions of law and legal duty.
In the Crito, Socrates carried on a dialog not only with his friend,
Crito, but also an imaginary dialog with the laws of Athens. The
sentiments of the laws are generally assumed to have been the view of
Socrates himself. 33 On the nature of the law as a directive to the
individual for the regulation of conduct, it was noted that "all [such]
orders are in the form of proposals, not of savage commands, and we
give . . . the choice of either persuading us or doing what we say." ' 34
From this it follows that the obligation to law entails either conformity with its dictates or an effort to persuade those responsible for the
laws to change or apply them in accordance with a proffered argument. 35 The alternative to doing as the law says is made quite
explicit: "if you cannot persuade your country you must do ...

After principled analysis, Socrates too addressed the possibility of escape, and found it, if nothing
else, unworkable for a person of his age and reputation. Id. at 53 b - 54 b.
Id. at 48 d. As one writer notes:
I'
By any standards this is a hard case, and one which raises a simple question: Can it
conceivably be true that a man ought to abide by his own death sentence, given that
the sentence was rendered according to law and that he is not guilty?
Allen, Law And Justice In Plato's Crito, 69 J. PHILOSOPHY 557, 558 (1972).
11 Crito, 51 c.
33 See, e.g., J. BuRNir, PLATO: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOCY OF SocrTEs, CRrro 279-80 (1924).
Burnet observes:
The personification of the Laws [who are of course to be pictured as august male
figures] allows Socrates to invest the declaration of his principles with a certain
emotion. It thus fulfills the same function as the myths of the more elaborate
dialogues.
Id.
3' Crito, 52 a.
3' See Woolzley, Socrates and The Law: the Apology and the Crito Again, 1976 PAmEIA 103.
Woolzley concludes that -[i]n the Crito the only permitted alternative to obedience is persuading, or trying to persuade, the authorities that the law in question is in some respect bad." Id. at
109.
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whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment that it
imposes, whether it be flogging or imprisonment. ' 36 From this it can
be seen that an individual faces a choice of obeying the command or
of persuading the authorities of the injustice of the command. The
term is not "convince" but "persuade"; from the nature of "persuasion" it follows that efforts at persuasion may be either successful or
not successful. It is when the efforts at persuasion have not been
successful that one must accept the consequent punishment for failure
to do what the law commands.
Socrates' own experience conformed to this mandate. He attempted in his speech to the jury, in the Apology, to persuade the jury
of his innocence 37 and to convince them not to impose sentence on him
for his teachings. 38 His efforts at persuasion failed and so he was then
required to accept the punishment imposed by the court. 3 The
obligation itself is provided in the alternative: do what the laws say or
attempt to persuade the-lawful authorities that the laws should be to
the contrary, with the consequence of failing to persuade being imposition and acceptance of punishment for failure to do what the law
says.
It should not be supposed that the alternative of attempting to
persuade can be based on any objection, legitimate or not. 40 The
alternative of persuading the authorities that the law should be otherwise is limited by a standard of justice. This limitation is made clear in
the Apology where Socrates first noted the overriding criterion to be
met in choosing to act in any way, including challenging the substantive content of a legal rule: "[there is] only one thing to consider in
performing any action-that is, whether [one] is acting rightly or
wrongly, like a good man or a bad one." ' 4' Socrates later specifically
applied this criterion to determine the appropriate character of efforts
to persuade a jury when he concluded that such arguments should be

3'Crito, 51 b.
37 See Apology, 19 b - 36 d.
" See id. at 35 e - 38 b. This passage was Socrates' presentation to the Athenian jury after
they found him guilty and as they were about to decide his sentence. Socrates' arrogance in his
argument is questionable as a trial tactic; as the punishment should fit the crime, he suggested
that he be given a reward, as the improvement of the city was always his goal. Id. at 36 c-d.
31 Apology, 38 c - 42 a. Accord, Crito, 54 b-e.
40 Woolzley views the option of persuasion as one requiring very strong moral objection.
[I]f the situation is such that it seems to him that it would be absolutely wrong to
behave in the way required by law, e.g., because it is an unjust discriminatory law,
then he is not going to see himself as having a problem: the moral claim of the
situation is a moral demand.
Woolzley, supra note 35, at 105.
41 Apology, 28 b.
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rational arguments for justice rather than mere emotional appeals;
Socrates reasoned, "[a litigant] ought to inform them [, the jury,] of
the facts and convince them by argument. The jury does not dispense
justice as a favor, but to decide where justice lies, and the oath which
at their own discretion, but to
they have sworn is not to show favor
' 42
return a just and lawful verdict. "
The relationship of law to justice is not merely one of limits of
persuasion, but in fact, justice places the boundaries on what the
individual can do in conformity with commands and on the degree to
which one can blindly act in accordance with the letter of the law.
This is the lesson of the three examples taken from the Apology which
were discussed above. Socrates was unequivocal that the obligations
of justice are prior to those of the law. 43 The obligation of justice
corresponds to the obligation to the law itself, 44 even to the necessity
of accepting punishment upon the failure of an attempt at persuasion.
"[I]t matter[s] all the world . ..that [one] should do nothing wrong
or wicked. [A] government [should] not terrify [one] into doing a
In reviewing the three occasions in his life
wrong action. . ..
which Socrates felt raised questions of conformity to laws or commands, he made it clear that the ultimate standard for his conduct in
both private and public life had always been justice. In the Apology,
Socrates asserted, "[y]ou will find that throughout my life I have been
consistent in any public duties that I have performed, and the same
also in my personal dealings. I have never countenanced any action
that was incompatible with justice on the part of any person .... 46
In the Crito as well, Socrates maintained that he had to act in accordance with justice. His refusal to escape and his willingness to suffer
imposition of his sentence was based not merely on the law but on the
fact that the duty to obey the law is rooted in justice. Socrates asked
Crito rhetorically, "[o]ught one to fulfill all one's agreements, provided that they are right, or break them?1 47 Further, "[i]f we leave
this place without first persuading the state to let us go, are we or are
"45

42 Id. at 35 c.
3 Id. at 29 d.
1 Id. at 32 c.
45 Id. at 32 d. Socrates was, of course, speaking both personally, of how he individually

acted, and normatively, of how people in general should act.
16 Id. at 33 a. Socrates also said:
Do you suppose that I should have lived as long as I have if I had moved in the
sphere of public life, and conducting myself in that sphere like an honorable man,
had always upheld the cause of right, and conscientiously set this end above all other
things? Not by a very long way, gentlemen; neither would any other man.
Id. at 32 e.
" Crito, 49 e.
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we not doing an injury, and doing it in a quarter where it is least
justifiable?" 48 At the end of the dialog, Socrates, speaking through
the voice of the laws, made it clear that both justice and law required
that he not escape and that he accept his sentence. 49 Justice is prior to
the law in that its claims prevent one from acting improperly even if
commanded to do so by public authority. Simultaneously, justice is
the foundation of law and gives laws and lawful commands their
binding character. It is necessary to determine the manner in which
the laws obtain their binding character, to in turn determine whether
Socrates had a complete and coherent theory of law and legal obligation.
Socrates, speaking through the laws, did attempt to provide a
theoretical basis for legal obligation in the Crito. The Crito can be
viewed as providing three principal bases for concluding that one is
obligated to obey the law; these are the argument from injury, 50 the
argument from agreement, 51 and the argument from piety. 52 Each of
these arguments have been subjected to critical study by commentators
with the result that some commentators find one argument more
convincing than others, 53 while other commentators find no one of the
arguments a sufficient basis for concluding that law impairs a binding
obligation.54 Rather than viewing each of these arguments as an
independent basis for legal obligation, it is the present contention that
48

49

Id. at 49 e - 50 a.
See, e.g., id. at 54 c.

-o See Crito, 49 a-c.
51 See id. at 49 c - 50 d.
52 See id. at 50 d - 51 d.

See, e.g., Allen, supra note 31. Allen views Socrates' theory of legal obligation as based on
the argument from injury. Nevertheless, the injury at issue is seen to arise from breach of the
agreement which is the basis of civil society and which is supposed by the obligation to act justly.
Allen sees the arguments of Socrates as principally limited to those of injury and agreement:
"[t]he two premises on which the argument of the Laws turns are that it is wrong to do injury or
return it, and right to abide by agreements, given that they are just." Id. at 565. The argument
from agreement, however, might be seen as derivative of the argument from injury. Allen
writes, "[a]greement, then does not serve as an independent ground for refusing to escape: it is
rather an essential link in a concatenated argument which rests on the primacy of justice." Id. at
563. He concludes "that this argument is not primarily contractual, but delictual: its gist lies, not
in breach of agreement, but in claim of injury." Id. While it is the view of this article that the
obligations of justice underlie the whole inquiry by Socrates, and while it is admitted that the
arguments are interrelated, it is further asserted that the arguments from injury, agreement, and
piety each make independent contributions to the theory of legal obligation and that without the
contributions of each argument the theory is neither complete nor coherent.
5 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 8. Martin maintains that the three arguments of agreement,
injury, and piety lead to a conclusion that all laws must be obeyed. This conclusion he objects to
in the face of the possibility of unjust laws, and so he argues that Socrates has failed to establish a
principled basis for any obligation to law. Martin begins by claiming the following: "li]t should
be noted, first, that in none of the three arguments for obedience to law-(l) injury to the Laws
and the commonwealth, (2) the 'agreement' with the Laws, and (3) piety to the state parent53
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the three arguments jointly give rise to an obligation to obey the law
when taken against and qualified by the fundamental obligation to
act justly. The argument from justice is of course prior to the other
three arguments, and is infused within the terms of the other three
arguments. Limits are also set on the implications and consequences
of conclusions reached within each of the arguments from agreement,
injury, and piety.
In the Crito, Socrates began his discussion of legal obligation by
stating that the standard for establishing such an obligation is not
popular opinion but rather the rule of justice, the criteria of "right"
and "wrong"; "what we ought to consider is not so much what people
will say about us but how we stand with the expert in right and
wrong, the one authority, who represents actual truth." 55 With reference to the specific factual issue under consideration, that is, whether
he should have escaped from prison without an official discharge
Socrates concluded that "[i]f it turns out to be right, we must make
the attempt, ' 56 however, "[i]f it becomes clear that such conduct is
wrong, I cannot help thinking that the question whether we are sure
to die . . . ought not to weigh with us at all in comparison with the
risk of doing what is wrong."' 57 Ultimately then, the nature and
limits of legal obligation will not rest directly on any utilitarian
ground but on the basis of justice itself.58 Nevertheless, while it may
be asserted that justice requires obedience to law, it is not clear on the
face of the assertion why this is so. Further inquiry must be made into
the ethical basis of legal obligation and the moral consequences of
disobedience of just law.
Obligation to law initially grows out of one of Socrates' moral
postulates, mainly, that "one ought not to return a wrong or an injury
to any person whatever the provocation is." 59 There is a tautological
quality to this postulate since in the Apology a just man by definition

did Socrates or the Laws assert that they applied only to just laws." Id. at 37. This leads to his
assertion that "the three arguments hold true for all laws-both just and unjust," id., and to
Martin's ultimate doubt of any viable Socratic theory of legal obligation. Id. at 38. Such a
reading fails to note the overriding obligation to do justice, and further the internal qualification
of justice in each of the arguments.
" Crito, 48 a.
Id. at 48 c. Cf. id. at 46 b-c (consideration of escape rather than outright rejection).
Id. at 48 d.
I7
See also Woolzley, Socrates on Disobeying the Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES
299-318 (G.Vlastos ed. 1971). Woolzley concludes that legal obedience is determined by fairness
and utility. Id. at 316 & 318.
SCrito, 49 c-d. Similarly Socrates asserted that "it is never right to do a wrong or return a
wrong or defend oneself against injury by retaliation." Id. at 49 d.
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has only one inquiry to make, mainly, "whether he is acting rightly or
wrongly, like a good man or a bad one." 60 In the process of obtaining
Crito's assent to these propositions- that "in no circumstances must
one do wrong" 6' 1 and that "one must not even do wrong when one is
wronged" 6 2 - Socrates suggested that this is a critical postulate, agreement to which may already entail agreement to the duty to obey law.
He warned, "be careful . . . that in making these single admissions
you do not end by admitting something contrary to your real beliefs."' 6 3 What injury would Socrates have done by disobeying the
law ordering his confinement and execution? In disobeying a legal
obligation one undermines the force of law by serving as an example
of law-breaking and by challenging the authority of the law and the
state one weakens that authority. Finally, by disobeying the law in
the specific case one has turned the specific law into a nullity and to
that extent one has nullified for oneself a part of the total fabric of the
law. Socrates considered these injuries to be necessary results of escape
on his part: "Can you deny that by this act which you are contemplating you intend, so far as you have the power to destroy us, the laws,
and the whole state as well?"6' 4 In Socrates' individual case the issue
was whether he could do wrong because he had suffered wrong at the
hands of the jury-whether criminality would be justified because of
the unjust misapplication of the laws. 65 The manifest answer is in the
negative.
60 Apology, 28 b.

61 Crito, 49 b.
62 Id.
03 Id. at 49 d.
4 Id. at 50 a-b. Socrates next asked, "[d]o you imagine a city can continue to exist and not be
turned upside down, if the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have no force?" Id. at 50
b.
Id. at 50 b-c.
In two federal criminal cases from the Vietnam era, the example of Socrates was invoked to
affirm the convictions of defendants who had in various ways harassed the selective service
authorities. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan,
417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969). The defendants asserted that their belief in the wrongness of
America military involvement in southeast Asia prevented them from forming the requisite mens
rea to commit the charged crimes, or in the alternative that such belief constituted justification
for their acts. The courts observed "that the exercise of a moral judgment . . . does not carry
with it legal justification or immunity from punishment for breach of the law." 417 F.2d at 1008
(footnote omitted). Accord, United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 703 (8th Cir. 1972)
(quoting Moylan). It was further noted that "[o]ne need only allude to Socrates . . . whose
actions supported this proposition." United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1008 n.21 (4th Cir.
1969). CJ. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 703 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972) (similar wording). As
a federal district judge for the district for Massachusetts commented, this interface between
disobedience to law and submission to its sanctions is exemplified in Socrates, who "swallowed
hemlock pursuant to an arbitrary Athenian decree rather than refuse obedience to the laws of the
city-state which had formed and protected him." Wyzanski, On Civil Disobedience, ATLANTIC,
Feb. 1968, at 58, 59.
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This was not an instance where the law would compel or authorize an unjust act by Socrates; such an act would be wrong and
forbidden by justice. On the contrary, Socrates was faced with suffering a wrong; at the same time Socrates' moral postulate prohibited
him from performing the wrong of escape merely because he had been
wronged by the jury. 6 In a sense Socrates was faced with the dilemma of suffering a wrong or doing a wrong. His moral sense struck
the balance against doing a wrong. It is necessary to show why
escaping and violating the law would have been doing a wrong. The
argument from injury creates an obligation of legal obedience qualified by the obligation to justice. Disobeying a just law injures or
destroys the law, but for that injury or destruction to be wrong, the
law itself must have some claim as right. This claim of right may rest
either in an assertion that the law embodies just rules of conduct to
which obedience is required or in the assertion that the system of law
provides a framework for a social order in which one may, on the
whole, act justly. These claims in turn are established through the
arguments from agreement and piety.
The argument from agreement begins with assent to the proposition that one "ought... to fulfill all one's agreements, provided that
they are right."'6 7 The duty to fulfill one's agreements is immediately
limited by the standard of justice. One's agreements must be right.
Why does justice require that one fulfill one's agreement, particularly
one's agreement to obey the law? And even prior to this, what is the
origin or source of the agreement to obey the law?
The establishment of the agreement to obey the law finds its basis
in consent of the citizen. 68 Alternatively, a citizen is estopped from
denying consent by the fact of having remained in the state, in Socrates' case by having remained in Athens after reaching maturity.6 9
"[A]ny Athenian, on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the
political organization of the state and its laws is permitted, if he is not
satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever he
likes." ' 70 Denial of one's obligations to the law and under the law is
not allowed one, having submitted to the city's jurisdiction and

" Some commentators have argued that suffering a wrong is to be distinguished from doing
a wrong, and that justice only required Socrates not actively do wrong. E.g.. Wade. supra note
12. This distinction is untenable even in terms of the examples raised in the Apology, most
particularly with reference to Socrates' refusal to give up philosphy even if commanded to do so.
67 Crito, 49 e & 52 e.
61 Id. at 50 c.
11 Id. at 51 d.
70 Id.
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power. 7' The second basis of the obligation to fulfill an agreement to
obey the law is derived from the consideration and receipt of benefits
from the state. The laws ask rhetorically, "[d]id we not give you life in
the first place? Was it not through us that your father married your
mother and begot you? ' 72 As a result of having received the benefit
of birth legitimized by the state, as a result of having received education, and as a result of having received the protection of the laws both
within the state and as against external enemies, the individual is
bound by the reciprocal nature of agreement to give fidelity to the
73
laws.
The argument from agreement is nonetheless not entirely satisfactory since consent to abide by the laws suggests that one "by so
doing has in fact undertaken to do anything we tell him."' 74 This
obligation to obey the law is qualified by, once again, the duty to
justice. Even the laws recognize the alternate forms of compliance, by
"doing what we say" or by "persuading" the authorities to the contrary, with the qualification that binding sanctions attach upon the
failure of persuasion.7 5 This formulation permits the conclusion that
one may refuse to do what the law says when it would require one to
do injustice, but does not provide a reason for suffering a wrong under
the laws. This is Socrates' case: he was faced with suffering a wrong in
the application of the law, and the need to find a principled basis why
such injustice should be suffered rather than resisted.
An answer in the case of Socrates may be found in the nature of
his agreement to obey the laws, and the fact that in accordance with
the laws of Athens he decided to stand his ground and defend himself.
By the terms of the "agreement," he was either to persuade the jury or
to accept punishment if he failed. The laws were made so that "even
at the time of your trial [,Socrates,] you could have proposed the
penalty of banishment, if you had chosen to do so. ' ' 76 A still more
general question of the nature of the agreement to obey the laws is
raised by an inquiry into the nature of the burden of suffering a wrong
at the hands of the authorities. The character of the agreement to
obey the law when faced with a threat of injustice in one's own
particular case is complicated by the fact that the laws in an ongoing

" Id. at
71 Id. at
"' Id. at
" Id. at
IId. at
7' Id. at

51
50
50
51
51
52

d-e.
d.
d-e.
e.
b.
c.
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society are open-ended; the terms of the agreement, as far as the duty
of the citizens are concerned, remain unspecified. How can one be
bound by such an open-ended agreement? 77 The answer lies in the
argument from piety, subject to the duty to justice.
The argument from piety supplements the argument from agreement. The argument from piety analogizes the authority of the state
and the duty to obey the law to the authority of natural parents and
the duty to obey parental commands. It is asserted "that compared
with your mother and father and all the rest of your ancestors your
country is something far more precious, more vulnerable, more sacred, and held in greater honor both among gods and among reasonable men. ' 78 From the greater authority and dignity of the state and
its laws follows "that you are even more bound to respect and placate
the anger of your country than your father's anger."79 It is observed
that one does "not have equality of rights with your father" and that
one was "not allowed to answer back." 80 One might similarly suffer
wrong from the state and laws to which one owes allegiance. This
follows not only from the receipt of benefits and thus from an imputed
agreement, 8' but as a requirement of obedience and respect for authority.82 While nature may necessitate one's submission to natural
parents, one's own decision to remain within a state gives rise to a
duty of obedience to lawful authority as a matter of justice. 83 Justice
gives rise to a duty through piety to obey lawful authority, and justice
in turn qualifies that duty. Justice serves as the originating source of
the duty to obey the law but also qualifies that obligation by providing that one may not do as the law says and rather attempt to
persuade authorities to the contrary.8 4 Yet justice requires one who
recognizes the legitimacy of a state to accept lawful punishment
where efforts to persuade authorities fail. 85
" The open-ended nature of the agreement to obey the laws has been argued to be the major
flaw in Socrates' theory of legal obligation, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 10, but the standards of
justice would qualify any terms of the agreement. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 31, at 565. While
justice may limit the terms of the agreement so as not to require one to do injustice, this analysis
does not suggest the reason why the open-ended terms of the agreement may require one to suffer
injustice. It isnot enough to say that breach of the law where one is made to suffer injustice
would weaken the laws' authority, since breach of the law where one is ordered to do injustice
also weakens the law. The duty to obey the law, even when one suffers injustice, is rooted rather
in the requirements of piety, which give rise to a duty to respect authority.
78 Crito, 51 a-b.
19 Id. at 51 b.
90 Id. at 50 e - 51 a.
RI See id. at 50 d.
82 Id. at 51 b.
Is at 51 d.
Id.
IId. at 51 b.
85

Id.
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As can be seen, within the Apology and the Crito Socrates took a
consistent position towards the obligations of the individual towards
the law, and enunciated a cohesive theory of legal obligation. Justice
gives rise to the obligation to obey the law; justice also qualifies this
obligation. Thus, Socrates did not argue for a duty to obey an unjust
law. Justice requires obedience to law, since justice requires that one
do no wrong, that one keep one's agreements, and that one obey
lawful authority; any obedience to law is subject to the prior, superior
obligation that one always act justly. Subject to a law, the individual
has a choice, of persuading the polity otherwise, or of submitting to its
fiat.

